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Case No. 20050453-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Johnny Udell,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (West 2004), and
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(e) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did defendant's live-in girlfriend have authority to consent to the search of
defendant's residence?
Standard of Review. The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v.
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, If 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are

reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application of the legal
standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 11,103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const., amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free
zone, a second degree felony; possession of marijuana in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor; and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A
misdemeanor. R. 2-1. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his
home. R. 49-43. After hearing argument on the matter, the court denied the motion. R.
60,67-63,98. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and possession of marijuana, a class B
misdemeanor. R. 84-77, 99. Defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress. R. 81-80. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term
of up to five years for the third degree felony and a jail term of 180 days for the class B
misdemeanor. R. 93-92. The prison and jail terms were suspended and defendant was
placed on probation. R. 93-91. Defendant timely appealed. R. 95.
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Summary of Facts
At the request of defendant's ex-wife, American Fork City police officers were
dispatched to defendant's residence to conduct a welfare check on his son. R. 67 (f 1).
As defendant spoke with the officers outside his front door, his live-in girlfriend,
Monica Auff hammer, also stepped outside. R. 66 (% 2). The officers noticed that she
smelled strongly of burnt marijuana and exhibited other signs of recent drug use. R. 66
(Tf 2). The officers asked to speak with her in private and defendant re-entered his
home. R. 66 (^f 3). When the officers told Auffhammer that they suspected drug use,
she began crying and admitted that both she and defendant had smoked marijuana in
the last hour. R. 66 (^f 4). She also admitted that drugs and drug paraphernalia were in
the home. R. 66 (^ 4). Officers asked Auffhammer for consent to enter the home to
search and retrieve the drugs and paraphernalia. R. 66 (f 5). She gave consent. R. 66

(115).
When the officers entered the home, defendant objected and demanded that they
leave immediately and secure a warrant to search his home. R. 66 (^f 6). When
defendant became physically threatening to the officers, he was handcuffed to ensure
the safety of both the officers and defendant. R. 66 (If 6). Auffhammer then assisted the
officers in a search of the home and curtilage, directing them to the location of drugs
and paraphernalia. R. 66 (^f 7).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court ruled that defendant's live-in girlfriend "possessed the authority
to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a warrant and without regard
to Defendant's protests." R. 65-64. Defendant does not dispute this ruling of actual
authority. Instead, he argues that the court should have suppressed the evidence
because the officers did not have enough information to reasonably believe that the
live-in girlfriend had the authority, i.e., the "apparent authority." The State need not
show both "actual authority" and "apparent authority." It need only establish one.
Because the trial court's ruling of actual authority is unchallenged, defendant has
waived it on appeal and this Court should affirm.

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BASED ON ITS
UNCHALLENGED RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S LIVE-IN
GIRLFRIEND HAD ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO CONSENT
The trial court ruled that because Auffhammer shared a close relationship with
defendant as his live-in girlfriend and enjoyed complete access to the home, she
"possessed the authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a
warrant and without regard to Defendant's protests/ 7 R. 65-64. On appeal, defendant
does not dispute the trial court's ruling that Auffhammer had authority to consent to
the search. See Aplt. Brf. at 5,8-11. Instead, he argues "that 'at the moment' the officers
entered his home they [did not have] enough information to determine Auffhammer
had common authority over his residence." Aplt. Brf. at 5, 8-11. In sum, defendant
challenges Auffhammer's "apparent authority" at the time of the search. Defendant's
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claim fails because the trial court's finding of "actual authority" justifies the warrantless
search, whether or not apparent authority also existed.
A.

The Law of Third Party Consent.
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a

warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973). Police may obtain that consent either
from the person whose property is to be searched or from a third party who shares
common authority over the property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974).
"A third party's consent to search is valid if that person has either the 'actual authority'
or the 'apparent authority' to consent to a search of that property." United States v.
Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215,1221 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, where actual authority exists,
the State need not prove apparent authority. See United States v. Aghedo, 159 F.3d 308,
311 (7* Cir. 1998).
1. Actual Authority.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), articulated the test for determining
whether a third party had "actual authority" to consent to a search of property. State v.
Duran, 2005 UT App 409, If 11, 535 Utah Adv. Rep. 42. Matlock explained that "[t]he
authority which justifies the third-party consent .. . rests . . . on mutual use of the
property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that
it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
number might permit the common area to be searched." 415 U.S at 171-72 n.7.
Therefore, under the Matlock test, a third party has actual authority to consent to a
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search "if that party has either (1) mutual use of the property by joint access, or (2)
control for most purposes over it." United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323,1329 (10th Cir.
1999); accord Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1221; Duran, 2005 UT App 409,«[[ 11.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "[mjutual use of property by
virtue of joint access is a fact-sensitive inquiry which requires findings by a court that
the third party entered the premises or room at will, without consent of the subject of
the search/' Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330. On the other hand, "control for most purposes of
property is a normative inquiry dependent upon whether the relationship between the
defendant and the third party is the type which creates a presumption of control for
most purposes over the property by the third party. If the relationship creates such a
presumption of control and is unrebutted, the third party has authority to consent to a
search of the property." Id. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that "[relationships
which give rise to a presumption of control of property include parent-child
relationships and husband-wife relationships." Id.
2. Apparent Authority.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), set forth the test for "apparent authority,"
i.e., whether the consenting third party had "apparent authority" over the premises, but
who in fact did not. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ^f 14. Rodriguez held that mistaken
reliance on third party consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment "'if the facts
available to the officer at the m o m e n t . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises." Id. at 188 (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).

Rodriguez thus held "that the Fourth

Amendment is not violated when officers enter without a warrant when they
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reasonably, although erroneously, believe that the person who consents to their entry
has the authority to consent to this entry/'' United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d
1225,1230 (10th Cir. 1998); accord Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1221. If the facts do not support
such a belief, "then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless
authority actually exists/7 Rodriguez, 497 U.S at 188-89.
The test for determining whether the third party had apparent authority "is an
objective one: '[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the m o m e n t . . . warrant a
man of reasonable caution [to believe] that the consenting party had authority over the
premises?'" Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188);
accord Duran, 2005 UT App 409, fl 14; Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1222. The Tenth Circuit has
explained that "[p]olice officers must evaluate the surrounding circumstances in order
to determine whether a reasonable person would 'act upon [the invitation] without
further inquiry/" Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188).
B.

Analysis.
On appeal, defendant claims that the search of his residence was invalid because

"the State failed to prove that 'at the moment' the officers entered his home they [did
not have] enough information to determine Auffhammer had authority over his
residence."

Aplt. Brf. at 8.

This is a challenge to the apparent authority of

Auffhammer. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. Had the trial court relied on apparent
authority in justifying the search, defendant's claim might have merit. But it did not. It
relied on actual authority. The trial court ruled that Auffhammer "possessed the
authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a warrant and
without regard to Defendant's protests." R. 65-64 (emphasis added).
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As explained above, actual authority does not turn on the reasonableness of the
officer's belief based on the known facts at the moment of entry. Cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
at 188-89 (holding that if facts do not support a reasonable belief that the consenting
party has authority over the premises, the search is unlawful "unless authority actually
exists"). To show actual authority, the State must present evidence at a suppression
hearing that the consenting party had "either (1) mutual use of the property by joint
access, or (2) control for most purposes over it." Rith, 164 F.3d at 1329; accord Kimoana,
383 F.3d at 1221; Duran, 2005 UT App 409, % 11.
Defendant relies on United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and
State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), for the proposition that ambiguity
requires further inquiry. Aplt. Brf. at 9-11. Defendant's reliance on these cases is
misplaced because they are limited to "apparent authority" cases. In neither case did
the government argue on appeal that the third party had "actual authority" to consent
to a search.1 As a result, both courts examined the searches under the "apparent
authority" analysis articulated in Rodriguez. See Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1073-75 (holding
that the information available to the officers was "insufficient to establish apparent
authority" under Rodriguez); Davis, 965 P.2d at 532-35 (citing Whitfield in support of its

In Whitfield, the district court's conclusion that Whitfield's mother did not have
actual authority to consent to a search of her adult son's clothing was unchallenged on
appeal. 939 F.2d at 1073-75. In Davis, this Court noted that defendant Hyatt's
testimony that her live-in boyfriend (Davis) had "access to" her car was insufficient to
establish that he had common authority over the car because "in addition to access,
common authority requires a showing of 'mutual use' by persons 'generally having
joint access or control for most purposes.'" Davis, 965 P.2d at 535 n.5 (quoting Matlock,
415 U.S. at 171 n.7).
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conclusion that the information available to the officers did not "reasonably support[ ] a
belief that Davis had common authority" over his girlfriend's car). Therefore, both
cases are inapposite.
Defendant has not briefed or otherwise challenged the trial court's ruling of
actual authority. He has thus waived it on appeal and this Court should not consider
that ruling. See Coroles v. Sahey, 2003 UT App 339, \ 17, 79 P.3d 974 (holding that
because plaintiffs did not brief the claim, they waived it on appeal). Based on the trial
court's unchallenged ruling of actual authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted December 29, 2005.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
/i———

—-y^-g^t^

£y S. Gray

y

ssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

Moreover, where defendant failed to challenge the trial court's ruling of actual
authority in its opening brief, it is precluded from challenging it in his reply brief. See
State v. Krueger, 2000 UT 60, If 20, 6 P.3d 1116.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 29,2005,1 served two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Johnny Udell, by causing them to be
delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows:
Margaret P. Lindsay
99 East Center St.
P.O. Box 1895
Orem, UT 84059-1895

Fey S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
12/29/20051:11 PM
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KAY BRYSON # 0473
Utah County Attorney
Jason Sant #9145
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 041401566

JOHNNY UDELL,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

This case is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as
a result of a search of his residence. The State is represented by Jason Sant and David Stewart
represents the Defendant.
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and submitted a memorandum in support of his
Motion on October 21, 2004. On November 19, 2004, the State filed it's Response to
Defendant's Memorandum. Finally, on December 1, 2004, this Court following argument and
clarification by the parties made it's Ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On March 26, 2004, American Fork police officers were dispatched to the
residence of Johnny Udell, the defendant, to conduct a welfare check on his son at
the request of the defendant's ex-wife.
1

GQU67

2.

While speaking with officers, the defendant's live-in girlfriend, Monica
Auffhammer, exited the home. She smelled strongly of burnt marijuana and
exhibited other signs of recent drug use.

3.

Officers asked to speak with her in private at which time Mr. Udell excused
himself and re-entered the residence.

4.

The officers expressed their suspicions regarding drug use to Ms. Auffhammer.
She became upset, cried, then admitted that both she and the defendant, Mr. Udell,
had smoked marijuana within the past hour. Additionally, she admitted that more
drugs and paraphernalia were still on the premises.

5.

Officers asked for and were granted consent, by Ms. Auffhammer, to enter and
search the home to retrieve all narcotics and paraphernalia she spoke about.

6.

Upon entering the home, the defendant, Mr. Udell objected to the officers'
presence in the residence, demanding that they exit the residence immediately and
secure a warrant. He became physically threatening and was subsequently
handcuffed to ensure the safety of both defendant and officers.

7.

Ms. Auffhammer then assisted the officers in their search of the residence,
directing them to various locations throughout the residence and it's curtilage
where several items containing drugs and other paraphernalia were found.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Probable Cause to Search.
Probable cause existed sufficient to search the residence. Probable cause exists where the
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably

^i6B

trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. State v. Dorsev, 731 P.2d 1085,1088
(Utah 1986). The question is, then, did the officers have enough particularized and trustworthy
information to give rise to the reasonable belief that an individual has committed or is
committing a crime.
When Auffhammer exited the residence she smelled strong of burnt marijuana. The
officer, as a drug recognition expert, immediately recognized the odor. Moreover, after
informing the woman of their concerns she admitted that she had used the drug within the past
hour.
The odor of marijuana combined with Auffhammer's admission to recent use provided
sufficient probable cause to search.
II. Consent to Search
A third party may consent to a search of another's property if the third person has
"common authority" over or a sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected. U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 (1974). Co-inhabitants of a property assume the
risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. State v. Davis. 965
P.2d 525, 532 (Utah App. 1998). "Voluntary consent of any occupant of a residence to search
the premises that is jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence
discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial." Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169.
This is the case, even if the other party objects.
Ms. Auffhammer is the defendant's live-in girlfriend. She and the defendant, though not
married, share a close relationship. She lives in his home and has complete access to the home.
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Therefore, Ms. Auffliammer having standing, "common authority" and sufficient connection to
the premises possessed the authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a
warrant and without regard to Defendant's protests.
ORDER
Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court HEREBY
ORDERS Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
Signed this ¥

day of

y^Am^cr/

, 2004
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the / i —"day of December, 2004, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
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David Stewart
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
245 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
(801)852-1070
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Fourth Judicial District Court
or utan uounty, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

Case No. 041401566 FS

JOHNNY UDELL,
Defendant.

)

Suppression Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
December 1, 2004

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE LYNN W. DAVIS,
Fourth District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the State:

Jason Sant
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
100 East Center Street
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

For the Defendant:

David A. Stewart
(No address provided)
(No phone number provided)

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027
W
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?
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i i

-21

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 1, 2004)

3

MR. STEWART: Your Honor, we were anticipating putting

4

on some evidence today, but we decided not to, and just submit

5

it for decision.

6

THE COURT: Okay, we have a motion to suppress.

7

have the State's respond to —

8

to suppress.

9

application of law.

response to defendant's motion

The timing is a bit critical as it relates to the
Tell me how and when did the police learn

10

to believe that the girlfriend lived at the residence?

11

before or after the search or when?

12

We

MR. STEWART: I think —

Was it

you know, I haven't discussed

13

that with Mr. Sant at all.

14

was a —

15

However I, you know, I don't know what her status is as it

16

relates to a residence, having a common authority or not.

17
18

I think it's been a belief that she

at least an overnight guest, which gives her standing.

THE COURT: Okay. At what stage did they learn that
she, you know, in terms of issues of standing

19

—

MR. SANT: Your Honor, from my understanding in talking

20

to Officer Holland before he moved to Alabama, was that they

21

had been aware at least of Mr. Udell, and had seen both of them

22

at the residence together several —

23

passing by the home.

24
25

Mr. Udell was suspected —
them.

on several occasions in

a suspected drug user to

So they kind of kept an eye on him. I don't know exactly

-31 I when they discovered that they were living together.

I have no

2

idea because neither officer had told me exactly when they knew

3

that; but it was discovered that they were living together.

4

THE COURT: Okay, but at least over some period of time

5 J they became aware that she was either living there or together
6
7 |

MR. SANT: At the very least, living there off and on.
THE COURT: In light of that, then she —

9 I standing issue evaporates.

then the

I'll deny the motion to suppress

10

by virtue of those representations; and then we need to go from

11

there.

12

You'll need to prepare an order denying the motion to

13

suppress, based upon your briefing, and then a supplemental

14

information as it relates to the officer's acquaintance with

15

the girlfriend and observations of her there on occasions as to

16

reason for purpose of standing.

17
18

Now what?

MR. STEWART: Your Honor, if we could set this for
entry of plea, probably in sometime in January.

19

THE COURT: We can do that.

20

COURT CLERK: January 12 T H at 8:30,

21

THE COURT: Sir, if you'll step forward and sign a

22
23

promise to appear in connection with that day.
(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
) ss .
COUNTY OF UTAH
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That this proceeding was transcribed under my
direction from the transmitter records made of these
meetings.
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the
same related which were audible through said recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 1st day of June 2 005.
My commission expires:
February 24, 2008

severly Lowe
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Utah County

BEVERLY LOWE
Notary Public
State of Utah
1909 S

¥

j ^ f f ^ o " Ave , Provo, u f 846061

